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Abstract
Many fear  China's accession  to the World Trade  aggregate  falls. New estimates,  from the global
Organization  (WTO) will impoverish  its rural people by  economywide  numerical simulation  model known as
way of greater import competition  in its agricultural  GTAP, of the likely changes  in agricultural  and other
markets. Anderson,  Huang, and lanchovichina  explore  product prices  as a result of WTO accession  are drawn
that possibility bearing in mind that, even if producer  on to examine  empirically the factor reward implications
prices of some  (land-intensive)  farm products  fall, prices  of China's WTO accession. The results suggest farm-
of other (labor-intensive)  farm products could rise.  Also,  nonfarm and Western-Eastern  income inequality  may
the removal of restrictions  on exports of textiles and  well rise in China but rural-urban  income inequality need
clothing could boost town and village enterprises,  so  not. The authors conclude with some policy suggestions
demand for unskilled labor for nonfarm work in rural  for alleviating  any pockets of farm household poverty
areas may grow even  if demand for farm labor in  that may emerge as a result of WTO accession.
This paper-a product of the Economic Policy Division, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network-is part
of a larger effort in the network to assess the impact of China's WTO accession. Copies of the paper are available free from
the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Sarah Lipscomb, room MC4-404,  telephone
202-458-7266,  fax 202-522-2530,  email address slipscomb@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are  also
posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  k.anderson@adelaide.edu.au,
jikhuang@public.bta.net.cn,  or eianchovichina@worldbank.org.  May 2003.  (33 pages)
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After fifteen  years of negotiations,  China acceded  to the WTO at the end of 2001.  During those
negotiations,  China  was  continually  opening  up  its  economy.  However,  substantial  economic
policy reform is still needed before the transition from plan to market is complete.  Some of those
remaining  reforms  will  be  introduced  over  the  next  few  years  to fulfill  the  legal  obligations
China has committed to in its WTO Protocol of Accession.
Keeping  the  momentum  of growth-enhancing  trade  reform  going  requires  convincing
sceptics  that there will not be significant  losers.  Yet such reform necessarily  involves  structural
adjustments  by households,  firms  and bureaucracies.  While  the economy  as  a  whole  can  gain
substantially  from those  adjustments,'  losses and even hardship  can result for some households
unless complementary  domestic  policies are in place to facilitate  adjustment and/or compensate
losers. That underscores  the importance of first analyzing the likely distributional  consequences
of the  reforms  themselves,  and  then  considering  what complementary  policies  are  needed  to
provide  adequate  safety  nets  for potential  losers.  Of particular  concern  in  China's case  is that
farm  incomes may  fall,  exacerbating  the rise since  the mid-1980s  in farm-nonfarm  and inland-
coastal  aggregate  income  inequality  and  possibly  reversing  the decline  since  the  late  1970s in
rural poverty (see Kanbur and Zhang 2001).
The  policy  changes  still  to  be  made  to fulfill  WTO obligations  will affect  all  areas  of
China's  economy.  Numerous  commentators  predict  a dramatic  effect on agriculture  and hence
rural areas,  because  the  reforms  in China  over  much  of the past quarter-century  bypassed  the
country's trade policies for key farm products.  Before acceding to WTO, China was required by
its trading partners  to commit to major changes in those farm trade policies by 2005 - protection
cuts  that  appear  far greater,  and  faster,  than  any  other  developing  country  was  required  to
commit  to  in  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Agriculture.  With  one-quarter  of  rural
households  in China living on less than  $1 a day  in  1999  (c.f.  1 per cent of urban households)
2such that more than three-quarters  of all poor Chinese people live in rural areas, concerns  about
the impact of WTO accession on poverty alleviation are understandable.
Meeting the commnitments  in  agriculture will directly  affect  China's farm  sector plus  its
food,  feed  and  fiber  processors,  as  well  as  consumers  of food  and  beverages.  lImports  of
numerous  land-intensive  farm products may increase, and most observers  presume that will put
downward pressure on prices  received by China's farmers. However,  reduced protectionism may
boost  output  and  exports  of  some  labor-intensive  farm  products  in  which  China  still  has  a
comparative  advantage.2  In addition, farm  households will be affected  indirectly by many of the
other commitments China has made in its WTO Accession Protocol. Especially important will be
the arrangements  for phasing out the 'voluntary'  export restraints on China's textile and clothing
trade, and the reductions in protection of the motor vehicles and parts industry. So too will be the
myriad  commitments  affecting  the  services  sector,  including  state  trading  enterprises.  Those
changes,  together with the promised increase  in a wide range of agricultural  imports, will allow
China  to  exploit  more  fully  its  strong  comparative  advantage  in  unskilled  labor-intensive
products - both farm and non-farm (Anderson  1990,  1992; Huang et al. 2000).
To  assess  the  long  run  impact  on  farmer  incomes  and on rural  areas  of the remaining
reforms  required to meet China's commitments  to the WTO membership,  it is necessary  to see
those  changes  in  the context  of on-going  economic  growth  and structural  change.  This  paper
therefore  begins  with a brief summary  of rural  developments  since the initial reforms  began in
the late  1970s,  of recent policies  affecting rural  households,  and of pertinent  reforms  still to be
delivered  as part of China's WTO commitments.  With that background,  the paper then provides
some  indication  of  the  likely  effects  on  the  welfare  of  different  factor  markets  and  hence
different  types of households  of the  reforms  to be implemented  between  2002  and 2007. Even
the direction,  let  alone  the magnitude,  of some  of the effects  cannot be  discerned  from theory
(Winters 2000; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2C01), so we use the numerical simulation model
known  as  GTAP to address  these issues.  The paper concludes by drawing  out implications  for
Chinese policy makers wishing to pre-empt any increases in food insecurity or rural poverty.
l Although national  gains from trade  are not guaranteed  while there  are major domestic  policy distortions  in place,
such as in the labor market. See, for example, Krishna and Yavas (2002).
2 The difficulties  China has had in exporting food products to, for example, Japan,  Korea and the United Kingdom in
the past year or so because of those countries'  quarantine/SPS  measures should ease following WTO accession, or at
least be challengeable  under WTO Dispute Settlement provisions. They are ignored in the empirical analysis below,
as is the possibility  that China itself may use quarantine measures to limit its imports of farm products.
3The setting
Rural developments since the late 1970s
The unilateral  decision in December  1978 to open up the Chinese economy was a major stimulus
to economic growth: the pre-reform rate of per capita GDP growth of 3.1 per cent per year more
than doubled, and has remained  above 7 per cent for the past two decades  (final row of Table  1).
Rapid economic  growth is normally accompanied  by a relative  decline in the farm sector, but in
China that was initially tempered by the introduction of the farm household responsibility system
(which led  to the replacement  of collective  farms  with individually managed  holdings),  and by
the raising of prices  received by farmers.  So began the process of moving away from the taxing
of agriculture  relative to other sectors  - a process  followed by most of the advanced economies
in the early stages of their industrialization  (Anderson  and Hayami  1986; Lindert 1991).
Agriculture  grew nearly  as rapidly as industry from  1979 to  1984. However,  the one-off
efficiency effects of moving to the household  responsibility system and raising relative prices for
farm products were  mostly reaped by the mid-1980s,  after which  agriculture  grew  at only one-
third the pace of industry and less than half that of the service sector as industrialization boomed
on the eastern seaboard (Table  1). Employment,  output and exports of rural township and village
enterprises,  meanwhile,  have boomed (Table 2). Despite  that, migration of farm workers to rural
industrial and service activities  (not to mention the temporary migration to urban jobs such as in
construction),  the average  farm size and the share of farm household  income from farming have
fallen steadily since the late  1970s (final two columns of Table 2). Table 3  shows the slowdown
in the decline  in  agriculture's  shares  of GDP and employment in the  1980s, and  its subsequent
acceleration  in the 1990s.
Income  growth  has boosted  the  demand  for foods that  are high in protein  and nutrients
relative  to  those  high  in  carbohydrates,  which  has  stimulated  major  structural  changes  within
agriculture  as farmers responded to changes in domestic demand. For example, livestock and fish
increased their share of agricultural  output from less that one-fifth in the late  1970s to two-fifths
by the late  1990s (Table 3), while within the crop sub-sector, fruit and vegetable production grew
two to three times as fast as grain output (Table 1). The prices and marketing of grain and oilseed
products have  continued to be highly regulated,  whereas  markets for horticultural,  livestock  and
fish  products  have  been  greatly  liberalized.  This  has  accentuated  the  growth  in  output  of the
latter group relative  to grain and  oilseed output since the mid-1980s  (Table  1).  Meanwhile,  the
4direct consumption  of grain by rural  as well as urban households  has virtually  ceased  growing
(Table 4) -- a consequence  not only of incomes  rising but also of population  growth slowing to
less than  1 percent per year and of cuts in the implicit consumption  subsidy for foodgrains.
The  use  of grain  for  animal  feeds  continues  to grow.  To date  that  has  been  supplied
almost  completely  by  rising  domestic  production,  such  that  the  trend  level  of  grain  self
sufficiency  has  remained  close  to  100  per  cent.  Table  5  shows  that  there  are  nonetheless.
considerable  changes from year to year in grain exports and imports.  It also shows that, overall,
China  has  remained  a  net  exporter  of food  and  feed,  with  meat,  fish,  fruit  and  vegetables
providing  most  of  the  growth  in  net  export  earnings.  However,  soybean  imports  grew
substantially  when  the government  (in anticipation  of WTO  accession)  lowered  the tariff from
114 per cent to 3 per cent in 2000.
Recent and  prospective policies affecting rural areas
As  in  most  developing  countries,3 agriculture  in  China  was  squeezed  at  early  stages  of
industrialization  with  gross  fiscal  contributions  to  the  sector  being  more  than  outweighed  by
implicit  taxation  in  the  form  of  depressed  prices  for  farm  products,  neglect  of  public
infrastructure  in  rural  relative  to  urban  areas,  and  capital  outflows  via  the  financial  system
(Huang and Ma  1998). Then price and other market reforms associated  with China's policy shift
from a socialist to a market-oriented  economy began to be introduced, starting with non-strategic
commodities  such as vegetables,  fruit,  fish, livestock,  and oil and sugar crops.  The  aims of the
early reforms were to raise farm level prices  and gradually deregulate the market.  As the right to
private trading was extended  to include  surplus output of all categories of agricultural  products
after contractual  obligations  to the  state  were  fulfilled,  the  foundations  of the  state  marketing
system  began  to  be undermined  (Rozelle  et  al.  1997).  Despite  periodic  stop-go  cycles  in  the
reform  process,  the  proportion  of  retail  commodities  sold  at  market  prices  has  kept  rising.
According  to Lardy (2001), the share for agriculture was just 6 per cent in 1978 but had risen to
40 per cent by 1985, 79 per cent by 1995 and 83 per cent by 1999.
What have these policies  meant for  nominal rates of agricultural  protection  in China (the
percentage  by which domestic prices exceed  prices at the country's border)?  Table 6 shows  new
estimates of nomninal protection  rates for key agricultural  commodities  for some  recent years.  It
3 See Sah and Stiglitz (1992) and Anderson (1995).
5suggests  rice,  meat,  fish and  fruit  and vegetables  have  been  priced  at less  than  border  prices
while  other  grains,  oilseeds,  sugar,  cotton  and milk have  been priced  at one-fifth  to  two-fifths
above border prices. Maize  and cotton also enjoyed export subsidies in 2001  (amounting  to one-
third and one-tenth of f.o.b. prices, respectively).
Table 6 also shows what China has committed to in its WTO Protocol of Accession:  tariff
rate quota will apply to grains, sugar and cotton for which out-of-quota tariffs are quite high, but
otherwise,  after  the  phase-in  period,  the  tariffs  range  between  just  1 and  15  per  cent  -
representing  substantial  liberalizations  over 2001  levels.  As well, producers of major crops may
continue to be affected by commodity-specific  policies of government procurement  of a portion
of the  crop at  lower than  market  prices  (as  in the  past - see  Sicular  1988)  or at higher  than
market prices (as in  1998 - see Huang  1998 and Lu 1999).
What will those reforms mean  for agricultural trade? Many analysts have been expecting
China to  become ever-more  dependent  on  agricultural  imports  in the  course  of the  economy's
rapid industrialization over  the past two-plus  decades.  Some extremists (e.g., Brown  1995) have
even suggested China could seriously deprive other developing countries of food. Yet as reported
above, net food import growth  has not yet happened,  at least not in a sustained way, and  China
has continued  to be a net exporter of meat, fish, fruit and vegetables. Indeed on occasions in the
latter  1990s,  China also was a net exporter of grain and cotton (Table  5). How much of that is
due  to  government  policies  that  constrained  domestic  demand,  including  occasional  export
subsidies, is a moot point.
In  its  WTO  Protocol  of Accession,  China  has  agreed  to  have  no  agricultural  export
subsidies,  and  to  limit  its  domestic  support  to  farmers  to  8.5%  of the  value  of production
(compared  with  10%  for  other developing  countries).  The import  market access  commitments
China has made to WTO members  look substantial  on paper. Tariff rate quotas will be retained
only on wheat, rice, maize, edible oils, sugar, cotton and wool, domestic production of which in
aggregate comprises only about one-sixth of China's agricultural GDP. The quota volumes  are to
grow  over  the  next  three  years  at  annual  rates  ranging  from  5 to  19  per  cent.  A  further
commitment by China is that state trading monopolies will disappear (except for tobacco):  even
though  some  state  trading enterprises  will  continue  to operate,  there  will be  competition  from
private  firms  in the  importing  and  exporting  of farm  products,  at least  within  the  tariff-rate-
quotas.
6Farmers and the rural sector more broadly  will be affected  also by China's commitment
to  provide  improved  and  WTO-bound  market  access  for  industrial  products.  Mineral  and
manufacturing  tariffs  will be bound  and generally  reduced on a broad  basis, with many  tariffs
falling to 10%  or less. Tariffs will be cut on accession and further cuts will be phased in by 2005
(with just a few exceptions).  Furthermore,  for industrial products,  China will reduce significantly
its  non-tariff  measures  and  eliminate  all  quotas,  tendering  and import  licensing  on  non-farm
merchandise  by  no  later than  2005.  Quotas  on Chinese  imports  of automobiles  and parts  will
grow  by  15%  annually  from  a level of around  US$6  billion in 2000,  and  these  quotas  will  be
eliminated  by 2005. For textiles and clothing,  however,  the current  'voluntary'  export restraints
will  not be completely  phased  out until  the end of 2008.  Substantial  commitments  to open  up
services markets  in China also have been made.
Over the  1990s the average scheduled tariff rates for manufacturing initially exceeded but
fell more than for agriculture,  and by 2005 the manufacturing  average will be well below that for
agriculture (a simple average of 7 per cent, versus  17 per cent for agriculture). That does not give
a true indication of the extent of change in protection that is taking place, though,  because in the
1990s  many  manufactures  have  been  entering  China  at  reduced  or  zero  tariffs  via  duty
drawbacks,  to encourage  foreign  investment  in  processing  of imported  intermediate  goods  for
subsequent export.  Some agricultural  products  also have entered at less than the scheduled rate,
including through smuggling.
What all this means for incentives  for each industry is difficult to discern precisely, but it
provides  better  information  than  has  been  available  to  date  for  analysing  empirically  the
economic  effects  of the  reforms associated  with China's WTO accession,  including the  impact
on factor rewards  and prices  from which  inferences  about income  distributional  effects can  be
made. We do this bearing in mind the marked differences  in per capita incomes between eastern,
central and western provinces,  and between  urban  and rural  areas  (as shown in Tables  7 and 8,
and in Kanbur and Zhang 2001).
7Applying the GTAP model
Version 5 of the computable  general equilibrium model of the global economy known as GTAP
is used here.4 Being  an economy-wide  model,  GTAP  describes  both the vertical  and  horizontal
linkages between all product markets within the model's individual countries and regions as well
as between  countries  and  regions  via their  bilateral  trade  flows.  For present  purposes  the  1997
data base is aggregated to 25 sectors  and 20 regions and projected forward first to 2001  and then
to  2007,  using  World  Bank  projections  of population,  income,  and  factor  endowments  (see
Appendix Table  A). The initial base case assumes China retains its protection policies as of 1995
and Taiwan  retains  its protection  as  of  1997,  but that  all  other countries  fully  implement  their
Uruguay  Round  obligations  on  schedule  before  2005.  China's  trade  policy  changes  between
1995  and 2001  are  assumed  to have  been in anticipation  of the requirements  of,  and hence part
of, China's  WTO  accession.  These  are  analyzed  in detail  in lanchovichina  and Martin  (2002),
together  with  the  effects  of implementing  over  the  next  few  years  the  remainder  of China's
commitments  as recorded  in its WTO Protocol of Accession.5 In this paper we focus on just the
additional reform commitments to be implemented after 2001  (relative to the revised base case in
which  China's reforms  only  up to  2001  are in place  and there  are  no further reforms  to 2007).
For key  agricultural  import policies  these remaining  reform commitments  are  assumed  to shift
nominal  rates of protection  (NRPs) from column 3 to column  6 of Table  6. As well,  the export
subsidies in place  in 2001 (34 per cent for maize,  10 per cent for cotton) are to be eliminated, and
we  assume  no new  farm production  subsidies  are  introduced.6 The choices  of  new  agricultural
NRPs fall into three categories:  no change if they were negative in 2001  (rice, meats,  vegetables
and  fruits),  a move to part-way  between  the  in-quota  and  out-of-quota  tariffs  if the TRQs  bite
4 The GTAP (Global  Trade Analysis  Project)  model is a multi-regional,  static,  applied  general  equilibrium  model
based  on  neo-classical  microeconomic  theory  including  full  employment  of  all  factors  of  production,  constant
returns to  scale and perfect  competition.  See Hertel (1997)  for comprehensive  documentation.  The Version  5 data
base  is  described  at www.gtaP.ore.  The  model  is  solved  with  GEMPACK  software,  described  in  Harrison  and
Pearson (1996).
5 A particularly  important  feature of their analysis  is the  inclusion of China's duty  exemptions in the base  scenario,
because  otherwise the model would overstate the gains from tariff reductions.  Tariff cuts are from 2001 applied rates
to post-accession bound rates (or zero if the latter  exceed  the former). In this application  the aggregate  trade balance
and  government  tax  revenue  are  both  assumed  to  remain  a  fixed  share  of GDP.  The  2001  trade  data  are  from
COMTRADE,  and the 2001  applied tariffs for China are from CDS Consulting  Co. (2002).
6 Three  non-farm  reforms of importance  are  worthy  of mention. The  'voluntary'  export  restraint  on China's textile
and clothing  exports  to  the  U.S.  and EU,  expressed  in the  base  scenario  as  taxes  on  those exports,  are removed;
restructuring  of the  motor  vehicles  and  parts  industry  following  WTO  accession  is  modelled  as  a  20  per  cent
productivity boost to vehicle  assembly,  following  Francois (2002); and  liberalization  of China's  services  trade also
follows Francois  (2002).
8(wheat, coarse grains, cotton),  and otherwise  a move to the new in-quota tariffs (oilseeds, sugar,
milk).  Sensitivity  of  the  results  concerning  the  first  two  categories  are  explored  in  the
qualifications section,  however.
If this reform were to require a movement of unskilled labor out of farm activities,  three
impediments need to be kept in mind. One is that those farm workers would be less than perfect
substitutes  for  those  already  in  non-farm  pursuits.  Econometric  work  by  Sicular  and  Zhao
(2002a)  suggested that restraints on mobility could be approximated via a CET function with an
elasticity of transformation  of 1.3.7 We have therefore incorporated  that in the GTAP model for
China.  Another  impediment  to off-farm  migration  is that urban  social  welfare  benefits such  as
subsidies  to  housing,  food,  education  and  health  care  are  not  available  to  non-urban  people,
except by purchasing a residence permit, or hukou (Zhao 1999). And the third impediment  is that
farm workers who permanently cut their ties with the rural sector may lose entitlement to retums
from their family's land, and even the direct support and assistance of family members  (IHussain
2001).  These  latter  two impediments  have contributed to the persistence  of a very large  gap in
farm  versus non-farm  returns  to unskilled  labor.  After  adjusting  for differences  in  work effort,
the  analysis  by  Shi  Xinzheng  (2002)  allows  us  to  estimate  that roughly  one-third  of the  gap
between  urban  and  rural  unskilled  wages  can  be  explained  by  the  registration  variable  and
differences  in the cost of living. 8 We have assumed that gap will persist even if workers do move
off the farm in the  initial simulation (although the sensitivity of the results to that assumption is
explored in the qualifications section).
The closure adopted here is a long-run one in which, in addition to the above assumptions
about farm labor, nonfarm  labor is mobile  between  nonfarm sectors,  capital  is mobile between
sectors,  and  agricultural  land  is mobile  between  industries  within  the  agricultural  sector.  This
closure differs  from the  short -run closure used by Chen  and Ravallion  (2002),  where  a large
number  of  households  is  examined,  based  on  current  occupational  classes.  With  these
modifications  to  the  GTAP  model,  what  results  emerge  from  implementing  after  2001  the
remainder of China's commitments to WTO members?  Eere we focus on comparing  farm versus
non-farm results.  This  is not quite the same  as  rural versus urban,  given the large  and growing
7 In  a  subsequent  analysis,  Sicular  and  Zhao  (2002b)  provide  estimates  of  2.67  for  the  "push"  elasticity  of
transformation  from changes in agricultural returns  to changes  in the supply of labor out of agriculture  but only 0.6
from  changes  in  non-agricultural  returns.  Ianchovichina  and  Martin  (2002)  conducted  sensitivity  analysis  on  the
implications of changes in these parameters.
9amount of non-farm rural activities (Table  2), but it is the best we can do with the GTAP model
which does not distinguish activities by location within a country.9
What results can we anticipate?
In a recent paper,  Carter and Estrin (2001)  develop a model with two sectors,  agriculture  and
non-agriculture,  that assumes capital  is sector-specific  and labor is intersectorally  mobile.  They
assume the trade  reform from China's WTO accession  will lower the relative  price of non-farm
goods  (larger  tariff  cuts  for  non-farm  than  farm  products).  If  the  economy  started  from
equilibrium in  the labor market,  that  price  change  would lower labor's  wage  in terms of farm
goods  and  would  cause  labor  to migrate  from  non-farm  to  farm  activities.  If,  however,  the
economy  starts  from a situation  in which  farm workers  face impediments  to migrating  to non-
farm employment,  the wage in the non-farm  sector  would have exceeded that  in agriculture.  In
that  case,  a  fall  in  the  relative  price  of non-farm  products  would  lower  the  non-farm  wage
without changing the low farm wage (if both are again measured  in terms of agricultural  goods).
If the  government  were  to  simultaneously  remove  the  barrier  to  out-migration  of farm  labor,
another  welfare  gain would  accrue  to the  overall  economy.  Farm  workers  would benefit  from
trade reform  alone in so far as they  consume non-farm  products whose  price is lower after that
policy change. They would benefit even more if the restraint on their migration were to be lifted.
Non-farm  workers,  however,  would  suffer wage  cuts in terms  of farm  products  from each  of
those two  policy  changes,  cuts  that may  offset  the fall  in the  price  of non-farm  products  they
consume.  Carter  and Estrin  therefore  conclude  that China's rural-urban  income  inequality  (at
least for laborers)  would be reduced from further trade liberalization  and more so if the current
policies that inhibit off-farm migration were relaxed.
Neat  though  the  Carter/Estrin  analysis  is,  it  ignores  the  differences  between  skilled,
unskilled  non-farm  and  unskilled  farm  workers.  Also,  its  assumption  that  the  incentive  to
produce  non-farm  relative  to  farm  products  will  fall  following  WTO  accession  needs  to  be
tested,  since there  will be some  positive and some negative changes  to the price of both sets of
highly  tradable  products.  Furthermore,  the  demand  for  difficult-to-trade  products  will  rise
following the income  gains from trade reform, and their cost of production will change. Does the
8  Of this, 28 percent is explained  by the registration dummy variable, and 6.5 percent by differences in living costs.
9  For a more-detailed  breakdown  showing both  farm  and  non-farm  rural  households,  see  Hertel,  Zhai  and Wang
(2002).
10Carter  and  Estrin  conclusion,  that WTO  accession  will  reduce  rural-urban  income  inequality,
hold up when account is taken of these  facts in a detailed empirical model  such as GTAP? And
how would poverty be affected, bearing  in mind that there are considerable  differences  between
the production  structures and per capita incomes of western,  central and eastern provinces  (Table
7), rural incomes are only one-third of urban ones (Table  8), and 85 per cent of rural households
in the bottom quartile of the income distribution are agricultural (Sicular and Zhao 2002a)?
What do the iresunlts show?
Our analysis begins  with the core accession  scenario, and then is followed by three variations on
that core scenario.
The core WTO accession scenario
To  begin  with  the  bottom  line  of  the  main  scenario  before  revealing  the  details,  the  core
empirical  results  suggest increases in farm-nonfarm  income inequality.  The main reason for this
is that opposite  to  the conclusion  of Carter  and  Estrin  the  GTAP  model  suggests  the  relative
producer  prices  of farm  products  will  fall  more  than  the  prices  of  labor  intensive  non-farm
products  following  the  completion  of WTO  accession  reforms  (Table  9).  Relative  prices  are
lower for labor  intensive  non-farmn products  compared with what they would be without those
remaining  reforms  --  despite  the removal  of the  'voluntary'  export restraint  on  sales of those
products  to the  U.S. and  European Union - for three reasons:  because the demand for labor on
farms  is lower which lowers  the cost of unskilled labor in manufacturing,  because import taxes
on the intermediate  inputs used in those  manufacturing  activities  are lower due to the accession
process,  and  because  the  real  exchange  rate  effect of the  tariff  reductions  lowers  the  cost of
nontraded goods and other factors used as inputs in production.
The  lower  cost  structure  in unskilled  labor  intensive  manufacturing  activities  by  2097
causes  the quantity  of unskilled non-farm  labor demanded  to be greater  (by 0.8  per cent);  but
lower farm product prices mean the quantity of unskilled farm labor demanded is less (by 1.7 per
cent). A consequence of the reform is a 0.7 per cent fall in the real wage for unskilled farm labor,
and  a  rise in  real  wages  for unskilled  non-farm  labor  of  1.2  per  cent  (after  adjusting  for  the
11change in the aggregate cost of living).'0 Farmers  are also made worse off by the lower demand
for  farm land,  the  return  from which is  5.5  per cent lower in  2007  following  WTO accession
reforms. Meanwhile,  the real wages of skilled labor increase by 0.8 per cent, and the rewards to
non-farm  capital  are  1.3 per cent higher.  Together these results suggest the owners of non-farm
capital gain almost the same in proportional  terms as unskilled laborers in non-farm employment,
but the latter do better than  skilled workers.  Hence  on balance  income inequality  may improve
slightly among non-farm households dependent mainly on labor income. 1 l
However,  income  distribution  can be expected  to worsen  as between  farm and non-farm
households,  although the degree depends on the proportion of farm household income earned off
the  farm.  With  only  1.7  per  cent  of  (or  about  6  million)  unskilled  farm  workers  leaving
agriculture for non-farm  work (because of the assumed impediments to out-migration),  and with
land returns depressed by 5.5 per cent in addition to farm labor returns being 0.7 per cent lower,
the gap between farm and non-farm incomes even within rural areas, and certainly between  rural
and urban areas,  looks set to rise slightly unless remedial  policy action  is forthcoming.  For farm
households  entirely dependent  on earnings from agriculture (type A in Table  10),  income would
fall  1.6 per cent on average.  This would differ little across the three regions identified in Table 7,
since product shares for farm  output - when fish products are ignored - are reasonably similar in
western, central  and eastern provinces.12 For farrn households earning 30 per cent of their income
from nonfarm unskilled work, however,  that income fall is only half as large (0.8 per cent); and
for  farm households  earning  60 per  cent  of their income  from  nonfarm  unskilled  work,  their
incomes would not decline at all (types B and C in Table  10 -- see rows 7 and 8).
Sectoral  details of the GTAP results  are summarized  in Table  9. Real consumer prices  are
lowered most by WTO accession  for motor vehicles,  oilseeds and sugar (and for beverages  and
tobacco,  although if China was using import taxes on those items as a form of consumption  tax
and  their decline  were  to  be  matched  by  an  increase  in  domestic  sales  taxation,  those  price
10  The  present version  of the  GTAP model has  only one aggregate  household,  so  it cannot distinguish  between  the
different  consumption  bundles  and  factor endowmnents  of different  types  of households.  Throughout,  real  price
changes  refer to the  change  in price relative to the consumer  price index change, given the consumption  bundle of
the aggregate  household.
"  Wages  of  skilled  workers  might  increase  more  than  suggested  here  as  we  do  not  capture  the  endogenous
productivity  growth resulting from the substantial liberalization of the service sectors.
2 However,  if we  look at northern  and southern  provinces  in  China, differences  could be large since  wheat,  maize,
soybean  and cotton  are planted  primarily in  northern China,  while rice,  horticulture,  livestock  and fish are  raised
mostly in southern China.
12declines  may not materialize).  They  are also lowered for textile products  and to a lesser extent
clothing.  Among the farm products,  consumer prices  are  raised  slightly for livestock  products,
somewhat more  for grains,  and significantly for cotton (plant-based  fibres).  Producer prices are
down more for farm products than for most other products except autos though, and farm output
is down for all but cotton  and  meat.  Moreover,  feedgrain  exports  shrink by three-quarters  and
cotton  exports  by  half with  the abolition  of export  subsidies.  The  difference  in  the  effects  on
production  and  consumption  shown  in  Table 9  reveal  that  China's  food,  feed  and  fibre  self-
sufficiency will be reduced at least slightly by these reforms. But the extent is really quite minor:
the  trade  balance  column  in Table  9  suggests  that for  all  agricultural  and food  products,  net
imports would be greater because  of the remaining  accession  reforms by only $3.96 billion per
year by 2007 (in 1997 US dollars), which represents  only 1 per cent of total imports.
The  above  results  depend  as  always  on  the  assumptions  in  the  model.  To  check  the
sensitivity of some of those assumptions,  three alternative  scenarios  were run to compare  their
results  with those in the base accession  scenario:  greater agricultural  protection cuts; removing
negative agricultural protection;  and removing the wedge between farm and non-farm wages.
Alternative scenario  1: greater  agricultural  protection cuts
What if the  grain,  sugar  and cotton  NRPs were  to  drop to the  in-quota tariff levels  shown  in
Table  6,  for example?  An  additional  GTAP  simulation  was  run and  the  differences  for  factor
rewards  are  not  huge  in  aggregate  but  they  would  be  in the  direction  of worsening  income
inequality:  unskilled farm wages would fall 0.9 instead of 0.7 per cent and rewards to farm land
would fall 6.4 instead of 5.5 per cent on the one hand, while on the other non-farm wages would
rise 1.4 instead of 1.2 per cent for the unskilled and 1.0 instead of 0.8 per cent for skilled workers
(Table  10).  These  changes  would  attract  only another  million  workers  from farms,  given  the
assumed  impediments  of off-farm  migration.  But  while  agricultural  incomes  would be  lower,
farm household  income would not fall if at least 60 per cent of its income came from wages of
non-farm  unskilled  labor  (see  row  8 of Table  10).  Domestic  production  of grains,  sugar and
cotton  would  be  less  though,  and  domestic  consumption  greater,  so  self-sufficiency  in  those
products  would  be slightly  lower.  Even  so,  net  imports  of all  food  and  agricultural  products
would be greater by only $1.5 billion per year by 2007 ($5.43  instead of $3.96 billion). Such an
import increase  would be within the tariff rate quotas for those items with the possible exception
13of maize (depending  on the extent to which other feedgrains that are not TRQ-restricted,  such as
barley,  are  substitutable  for  maize).  National  economic  welfare  would  be  only  very  slightly
greater in this case as compared with the core scenario (see bottom row of Table  10).
Alternative scenario  2: removing negative agricultural  protection
If the negative NRPs for rice, meats, vegetables and fruits were to be raised to zero, the income
distributional  effects  would  go  in  the  opposite  direction  to  those  in  the previous  alternative
scenario  (less  inequality  between  farm  and  non-farm  households).  The changes  are  not great
though,  even  though  these products  account  for nearly  40  per  cent of the value  of food  and
agricultural output in China.  As can be seen by comparing columns  1, 2 and 3 of Table  10, they
would  involve  about  as much  improvement  in  income  distribution  as  the previous  alternative
scenario  would  worsen it.  This case  involves  a 3 per cent larger national economic  welfare  gain
than the core case (bottom row of Table  10).
Alternative scenario  3: removing the wedge between farm and non-farn wages
If one expected all off-farm migrants to go to rural  rather than urban non-farm jobs, and if those
migrants  were just as  adept  at such  non-farm  work  (e.g., because  they are young  or even just
school-leavers  and hence no different  from other new entrants to unskilled rural non-farm work),
the assumption  above of a one-third wedge between farm and non-farm  wages for the unskilled
could be dropped.'3 Rerunning the model without that assumed wedge has significant impacts on
the  estimated  number  of farm  workers  moving  to  non-farm  employment  and  on  the  industry
composition of China's economy. Approximately  28 million people would leave their farm jobs as
a  result  of  accession  if that  barrier  to  farm  out-migration  was  removed,  compared  with  the
estimated 6 or 7 million people mentioned above when the hukou system remains in place.
The impact on industry composition  of removing that labor market distortion  is substantial'.
WTO accession  will have a much stronger positive impact on China's manufacturing  and service
sectors  if the hukou system is abolished.  This will allow  more production of metals,  automobiles
and electronic  equipment, and more services.  That is possible in this scenario because factor use in
farming  and  hence  agricultural  output  are  less,  which  also  means  more  imports  of food  and
agricultural products are needed ($10.2 billion by 2007 instead of the $3.96 in the core scenario).
3 Evidence of increased  flexibility in China's labor markets in recent times is presented  in Lohmar (2001).
14The consequences  for income distribution  are dramatic.  Table  10 shows that this greater off-
farm migration of workers would cause earnings of farm workers (mostly self-employed farmers)
to rise because of WTO accession by  16.8  per cent, instead of falling by 0.7 per cent as in the core
accession  scenario.  Even though the reduced demand for land would cause  its rental value to fall
more (9.7 instead of 5.5 per cent), the farmers'  overall  earnings from agriculture would be 6.8  per
cent  greater  in  this  scenario  - in  stark  contrast  to  the  core  scenario  where  they  fall.  True,  the
earnings of all other factor owners fall in this scenario, particularly unskilled nonfarm labor (by 3.8
per cent). However,  given that farmers  are among the country's poorest households,  this scenario
suggests  that  WTO  accession  would  reduce  income  inequality  and  poverty  if the  labor  market
distortion  associated  with the hukou system were to be reformned.  It also suggests that the boost to
national  economic  welfare  in  aggregate  could  be  greater  if  WTO  accession  were  to  be
accompanied  by labor market  reform:  $11  billion  per year  instead  of just  the $9.6  billion  in the
core accession scenario.
Co¢ndilUAonM asd polcy iMmplczftioms
The assumption  in  GTAP  that  all  households  are  identical  in  their consumption  patterns  is of
course  a  fiction.  They  differ  as  between  urban  and  rural  areas,  between  farm  and  non-farm
households  within  rural  areas,  and  within  each  of those  groupings  according  to  region  and
income level. Post-simulation analysis at that level of detail for the short run is provided  in Chen
and Ravallion  (2002).  But even without that detail, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions
about the long run implications of WTO accession for agriculture and for income distribution.
Our  initial  analysis  assuming  no  reform  of  the  hukou  system  affecting  labor  market
suggests  rural  non-farm incomes  will  rise on  average  absolutely  and  possibly even  relative  to
urban  incomes  in  the  case  of  households  depending  just  on  labor  income  (assuming  urban
laborers  are  more skilled).  However,  some  farm households  facing  increased import competition
may be worse off in this case, ceteris paribus, if they are:
o  unable to send household members to jobs in expanding industrial and service industries;
o  are too poorly served  with infrastructure  to attract such activities to their own region;
o  are unable to diversify into producing farm goods whose relative price has risen; and/or
o  do not have relatives able to repatriate non-farm earnings to them.
15Thus in the core scenario the incidence of rural non-farm poverty will fall mainly because
of the growth in wages for unskilled workers in rural non-farm activities, while poverty may well
increase  in  agriculturally  based  hinterland  provinces  a  long  way  from markets  and  in regions
poorly served with the necessary  infrastructure to attract investment  in such expanding  activities
as textiles and clothing.
The first alternative scenario  shows that this situation would be exacerbated slightly if the
TRQ-protected  items  (grains,  sugar  and  cotton)  were  to  become  even  less  protected  than  we
initially assumed. By way of contrast, the second alternative scenario suggests the situation could
be  made  slightly  less  extreme  by  removing  the  negative  protection  affecting  rice,  meats,
vegetables  and  fruits.  But  both  of  these  alternatives  only  involve  small  changes  to  the
magnitudes  of effects,  rather than  altering  the sign  of those  effects,  and  both add  only  a small
amount to the aggregate  gains from trade liberalization.
What the third alternative scenario makes clear, by way of contrast, is that the sign of the
effects  could  be  switched  to  favor  the  poorer  farm  households  - albeit  at the  expense  of the
richer non-farm  ones  - if the remaining  WTO  accession  were to be  accompanied by reform  of
the hukou system that allowed  some members  of those households  to obtain higher-paying  non-
farm  employment  and  repatriate  earnings  back  to  their  farm  family.'4 And  this  case  would
involve a national economic welfare gain that is one-sixth  above that in the core scenario  without
labor market reform.
National  self-sufficiency  in  food,  feed  and  fiber  will  fall  somewhat,  particularly  as
demand  for livestock products  grows with income gains  from trade reform  and as production  of
natural  fibre-based  textiles  and  clothing  expand.  But  overall,  most  of  these  self-sufficiency
effects  of the remaining reforns that  are required  following WTO  accession  are relatively very
small in  magnitude.'5 They would  be  largest  in  the  third  alternative  case  where  labor  market
distortions are also removed.  That is not to say food security  would fall in that case though. It is
changes  in incomes  of the  poor,  and hence  in their  capacity  to purchase  food,  that affect  food
14 These alternative  results for the long run complement the findings of Chen and Ravallion  (2002) for the short-run.
What they  underscore  is that  whether a particular  group gains  or loses  from  a shock such  as WTO  accession  in the
long run depends  heavily on their sources of household  income  and their capacity  to adapt to the changed economic
circumstances.
15 They are especially small  when compared with the changes  that are taking place  in the course of normal economic
growth,  as  shown  retrospectively  in Tables  1-5  above  and  prospectively  in earlier  analyses  by  Anderson  et  al.
(1997a, b) and in  lanchovichina  and Martin (2002).
16security,  and in that third alternative  scenario the poorest aggregate group  (farm households that
had been heavily dependent on agriculture) would gain most.
What else  should  be  done if the labor  market were  not to be  reformed?  If in that  case
some farmers'  incomes  are to  worsen relative  to those of non-farm  households,  and if there  is
concern  about the fall in agricultural  self-sufficiency,  it does not follow that trade reform should
be abandoned.  Rather,  first-best ways of dealing with those concerns should be sought (and with
any transitory  unemployment that might follow reformn).  The most efficient policy responses  are
likely to  involve investments  in rural  human capital, rural infrastructure  and R&D  (Fan, Zhang
and Zhang 2002),  improvements in the land tenure system and rural financial markets, reductions
in informal taxes/levies on farmers by local governments, and changes in grain marketing.
First,  the  government  might  consider  further investments  in  basic  rural  education  and
health  services to reduce  the adverse  effect of trade reform  on poverty  incidence  and perceived
food  security.  Better  education  and  health  for  farmers'  children  not  only  boosts  their  farm
productivity should they choose to stay on the farm after finishing school;  it also increases  their
capacity to find more-lucrative  off-farm work and to adjust to non-agricultural  employment and
living (Schultz  1975;  Zhang et al.,  2002).  In addition to those  longer-term  benefits, there  could
also be an immediate poverty  alleviating effect if the government  were to cut basic  school fees
and make up the shortfall with a bigger direct grant to rural primary and middle schools.
Second,  improvements  in rural  infrastructure  such  as  roads and  rail mean that  a larger
share of the price eventually received  at the end of the marketing chain for farm products can be
passed back to farmers.  Such improvements  also lower the barrier for off-farm work by members
of  farm  households,  making  it  easier  for  them  to  take  advantage  of expanding  employment
opportunities in rural townships.
Third,  agricultural R&D can ease both urban and rural poverty (see Fan, Fang and Zhang
2001;  Hazell  and  Haddad  2001).  A boost in  agricultural  productivity  could  significantly  offset
the  2-8  per cent  drop in  agricultural production  that is estimated  in  the  core  scenario to result
from WTO accession.  An important policy issue here is whether China should deny itself the use
of GMOs in food production.  Since our results suggest China would be exporting less food post-
WTO accession  and beyond,  there is less sense in banning food  GMOs in China  if such a ban
were  to be imposed simply because of fears of otherwise being denied access into food markets
abroad (Anderson and Yao 2002; Huang et al., 2002).
17Fourth, improvements  in the land tenure system  would not only increase  the incentive to
invest more in land but would also enhance the collateral  of farm households.  If accompanied by
improvements  in  rural  financial  markets,  investments  by  farmers  back into  agriculture  would
rise. They would rise further if returns were increased via reductions in informal taxes/levies on
farmers by local governments.
And fifth, the government might reduce its regulation of grain marketing and in particular
cease  compulsory procurement  from farmers  at less than market prices  and reduce  the provision
of grain  to urban  consumers  at  less than  market  prices.  De-empahsising  the Governors'  grain
responsibility  system (provincial  self-sufficiency) would allow more  exploitation of comparative
advantage within China too.
If all that was considered insufficient support for incomes of the poorest farm households,
short-term  adjustment  assistance  via  infra-marginal  (and  hence  not output-inducing)  producer
price subsidies could be provided so as to boost their farm incomes without boosting farm output
(in an equal but opposite way to that used to tax farmers  in earlier decades -see  Sicular  1988).
Such an intervention could well be deemed WTO-consistent because of its decoupled nature, and
in any case if it was just targeted to poor farmers  it is unlikely to ever exceed 8.5 per cent of the
value of China's  output of the  product  concerned  (its  de minimis exemption  limit  for product-
specific support under Article 6.4 of the WTO' s Agreement on Agriculture).
Finally, now that China is in the WTO it has the opportunity to take part in new rounds of
multilateral  trade  negotiations,  whereby  it can  seek  increased  market  access  for its  exports  of
farm (and  other)  products  abroad.  While  not taken  into  account  in the present  paper,  if WTO
membership  enhances  China's  chances  of expanding  its  access  to agricultural  more than other
markets  abroad  in  the  future,  that would  be  a  positive  benefit  of WTO  accession  for China's
farmers and rural  areas. Martin (2002) points out that Chinese farm exports face particularly high
barriers abroad,  so this potential benefit is non-trivial in principle (although  in practice  it may be
difficult  to  secure,  especially  if the  main  barriers  are  SPS  measures).'6 That  proposition  was
tested  recently  by  Yu  and  Frandsen  (2002),  also  using  the  GTAP  model.  They  find  that
reductions  in  barriers  to  agricultural  imports  and  in  domestic  support  to  farmers  in  OECD
countries reduces the extent to which China's farm output would fall with WTO  accession and in
18some  cases  leads  to  outputs  expanding  instead  of contracting.  As  a  consequence,  China's
agricultural  imports  are reduced  slightly  and its agricultural  exports  are greater.  These changes
are reflected  in Table  11: it shows  that not only would China's food  self-sufficiency  be higher
with than without  agricultural  protection  in the EU, US and Japan, but  that the difference  is in
most cases more than enough to offset the fall in self sufficiency that is estimated  to result from
China's WTO  accession.  Such reform  in the  OECD would clearly  benefit farm households  in
China, providing  a further pro-poor consequence of trade reform.
16  There  is  also  the  question  of how  China's  membership  will  alter  the  relative  strengths  of  liberal  versus
protectionist  forces  in  the  next WTO rouna.  f multilateral  farm  trade negotiations.  Mathews  (2002)  argues  that
China's accession is likely to affect both sides, so the net effect is difficult to discern a priori.
19References
Anderson,  K.  (1990),  Changing Comparative  Advantages in China: Effects on Food, Feed and
Fibre  Markets, Paris: OECD in English and French (and Beijing:  Economic Science Press for the
State Planning Commission,  1992 in Chinese).
Anderson,  K.  (ed.)  (1992),  New Silk Roads: East Asia and World Textile Markets, Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Anderson,  K.  (1995),  "Lobbying  Incentives  and the  Pattern  of Protection  in  Rich  and  Poor
Countries", Economic Development and Cultural Change  43(2): 401-23,  January.
Anderson, K.,  B. Dimaranan,  T. Hertel and W.  Martin (1997a),  "Asia-Pacific  Food Markets  and
Trade  in 2005:  A Global, Economy-Wide  Perspective",  Australian Journal  of Agricultural and
Resource Economics 41(1):  19-44, March.
Anderson,  K.,  B.  Dimaranan,  T. Hertel  and W. Martin  (1997b),  "Economic Growth  and Policy
Reforms in the APEC Region:  Trade and Welfare Implications by 2005", Asia-Pacific  Economic
Review 3(1):  1-18,  April.
Anderson,  K.,  Y. Hayami  and others (1986),  The Political  Economy of Agricultural Protection:
East Asia  in International Perspective, Boston,  London  and  Sydney:  Allen  and  Unwin  (also
available  in  an  expanded  Chinese  language  edition  translated  by  F.  Cai,  Tianjin:  People's
Publishing House,  1996).
Anderson,  K.  and S.  Yao  (2002),  "China,  GMOs  and World  Trade in Agricultural  and Textile
Products", Pacific Economics Review (forthcoming).
Brown,  L.R. (1995),  Who  Will Feed China? Wake-up Call  for a Small Planet, New York: W.W.
Norton.
Carter, C.A.  and A. Estrin (2001),  "China's Trade  Integration and Inpacts on Factor Markets",
mimeo, University of California, Davis, January.
CDS Consulting Co. (2002), "Applied Tariffs in China, 2001", Washington,  D.C.
Chen,  S.  and  M  Ravallion  (2002),  "Household  Welfare  Impacts  of China's  Accession  to  the
WTO"  paper  for the  DRC/World  Bank project  on WTO  Accession  and Poverty  Reduction  in
China, World Bank, Washington,  D.C., October.
Fan,  S.,  C.  Fang  and X.  Zhang  (2001),  "How  Agricultural  Research  Affects  Urban  Poverty  in
Developing Countries:  The Case of China", Environment and Production Technology Discussion
Paper 83, IFPRI, Washington, D.C., October.
20Fan, S., L. Zhang and X. Zhang (2002),  Growth, Inequality, and Poverty in China: The Role of
Public Investments, IFPRI  Research  Report  125, Washington,  D.C.:  International  Food  Policy
Research Institute, April.
Francois,  J.  (2002), 'The Motor Vehicle  Sector in China and WTO  Accession", paper prepared
for the  DRC/World  Bank's  Conference  on China's  WTO  Accession  and  Poverty  Alleviation,
Beijing, 28-29 June.
Friedman, J. (2000),  "Differential  Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Indonesia's  Poor and Non-
poor",  paper  presented  at  the  World  Bank  Conference  on  International  Trade  and  Poverty,
Stockholm,  20 October.
Harrison,  W. J.  and K  R. Pearson  (1996),  'Computing  Solutions  for Large General  Equilibrium
Models Using GEMPACK', Computational  Economics 9: 83-172.
Hazell,  P.  and  L.  Haddad  (2001),  "Agricultural  Research  and  Poverty  Reduction",  Food,
Agriculture,  and the Environment Discussion Paper 34,  [FPRI, Washington, D.C., August.
Hertel,  T.W.  (1997)  (ed.),  Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, Cambridge  and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hertel,  T.W.  (2001),  "Assessing the Poverty Consequences  of China's  WTO Accession",  paper
outline  presented  at the first project  meeting  on WTO  Accession,  Policy  Reform  and Poverty
Reduction in China, World Bank Resident Mission, Beijing, 6-7 May.
Hertel,  T.W.,  P.V.  Preckel,  J.A.L.  Cranfield  and  M.  l[vanic  (2002),  "Poverty  Impacts  of
Multilateral  Trade  Liberalization",  paper presented  at  the  5h Conference  on Global  Economic
Analysis, Taipei, 5-7 June.
Hertel, T., F. Zhai and Z. Wang (2002), "Implications  of WTO Accession for Poverty in China",
paper  for  the  DRC/World  Bank  Conference  on  China's  WTO  Accession  and  Poverty
Alleviation, Beijing, 28-29 June.
Huang, J.  (1998),  "Evaluation  of Current  Three-Grain-Policy",  CCAP's Working Paper WP-00-
COI,  Center  for  Chinese  Agricultural  Policy,  Chinese  Academy  of  Agricultural  Sciences,
Beijing.
Huang, J.  (2001),  "Agricultural  Policy and Food Security in China",  mimeo, Center for Chinese
Agricultural  Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing.
Huang,  J.,  R.  Hu,  H.  von  Meijl  and  F.  von  Tongeren  (2C02).  "Biotechnology  Boots  to  Crop
Productivity in China and Its Global  Inpacts",  a paper presented at the 5th Conference on Global
Economic Analysis, Taipei, 5-7 June 2002.
Huang,  J.  and  H.  Ma  (1998.),  "The  20-Year  Reform  and  the Role  of Agriculture  in  China:
Capital Flow from Rural to Urban and from Agriculture to Industry," Reform 5:  56-63.
21Huang,  J. and S. Rozelle (2002),  "The Nature of Distortions  to Agricultural  Incentives  in China
and Inplications  of WTO Accession",  revision (2 April)  following  its presentation  at the second
project  meeting  on  WTO  Accession  and  Poverty  Reduction  in  China,  World  Bank  Resident
Mission, Beijing, 26-27 October 2001.
Huang,  J.,  S.  Rozelle,  and  L.  Zhang  (2000),  "WTO  and  Agriculture:  Radical  Reforms  or the
Continuation of Gradual Transition",  China Economic Review 11: 397401.
Hussain, A. (2001), "Social  Safety Net Policies in China", paper presented at the second project
meeting  on  WTO  Accession,  Policy  Reform  and  Poverty  Reduction  in  China,  World  Bank
Resident Mission, Beijing, 26-27 October.
lanchovichina,  E. and W. Martin (2002), "Economic Impacts of China's Accession to the WTO",
paper  for  the  DRC/World  Bank  Conference  on  China's  WTO  Accession  and  Poverty
Alleviation,  Beijing, 28-29 June.
Johnson,  D.G.  (2001),  "The  Urban-Rural  Disparities  in  China:  Irnplications  for the  Future  of
China", The Second Huang Lian Memorial Lecture, CREDPR,  Stanford University,  27 February.
Kanbur,  R.  and  X.  Zhang  (2001),  "Fifty  Years  of Regional  Inequality  in  China:  A Journey
Through Evolution, Reform  and Openness",  CEPR Discussion Paper No.  2887, London:  Centre
for Economic Policy Research, July.
Krishna,  K. and C. Yavas  (2002),  "When Does Trade Hurt? Market, Transition  and Developing
Countries",  NBER Working Paper 8995, Cambridge MA, June.
Lardy,  N.  (2001),  Integrating China in  the  Global Economy,  Washington,  D.C.:  Brookings
Institution.
Lindert,  P.  (1991), "Historical  Patterns of Agricultural  Protection",  in Agriculture and the State,
edited by P. Timmer, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Lohmar, B.  (2001), "Changes  in Labor,  Land and Credit  Markets  Lead China's  Farmers on the
Path Toward Modernization",  pp. 9-12 in China: Agriculture in Transition,  ERS Outlook Report
WRS-01-2,  edited by H.-H.  Hsu and F. Gale, Washington, D.C.: US Department  of Agriculture,
November.
Lu, F. (1999),  "Three Grain Surpluses: Evolution of China's Grain Price and Marketing Policies,
1978-1999",  paper  presented  to  the  Symposium  on  China's  Agricultural  Trade  and  Policy:
Issues,  Analysis  and  Global  Consequences,  San  Francisco,  June  25-26,  1999  (http:
//aic.ucdavis.edu/research/).
Martin,  W.  (2002),  "Implication  of  Reform  and  WTO  Accession  for  China's  Agricultural
Policies", Economies in Transition  (forthcoming).
22Mathews,  A. (2002), "The Possible Hmpact of China's WTO Accession on the WTO Agricultural
Negotiations",  The World Economy (forthcoming).
McCulloch,  N.,  L.A.  Winters  and  X.  Cirera  (20O1),  Trade Liberalization and Poverty: A
Handbook, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Rozelle, S., A. Park, J. Huang and H. Jin (1997),  "Liberalization and Rural Market Integration in
China,"  American Journal  ofAgricultural  Economics 79(2):  635-642, May.
Sah,  R.  and  J.E.  Stiglitz  (1992),  Peasants versus City-Dwellers: Taxation and the Burden of
Development, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schultz,  T.W.  (1975),  "The  Value  of the  Ability  to  Deal  With  Disequilibria",  Joumal of
Economic Literature 13(3): 82746, September.
Shi,  Xinzheng  (2002),  'Empirical  Research  on  Urban-Rural  Income  Differentials:  A  Case  of
China,' mimeo, Peking University.
Sicular,  T. (1988),  "Plan  and Market in  China's Agricultural  Commerce",  Journal of Political
Economy 96(2): 383-87, April.
Sicular,  T.  and  Zhao,  Y.  (2002a),  "Employment,  Eamnings  and  Poverty  in  Rural  China:  A
Mcroeconomic  Analysis",  paper  for  the  DRC/World  Bank  Conference  on  China's  WTO
Accession and Poverty Alleviation,  Beijing, 28-29 June.
Sicular, T. and Zhao, Y. (202b), 'Earnings  and Labor Mobility in Rural China: Implications  for
China's WTO Entry', Mimeo.
Winters,  L.A.  (20), "Trade,  Trade  Policy,  and  Poverty:  What  Are  the  Links?"  CEPR
Discussion Paper 2382, London:  Centre for Economics Policy Research, March.
Yu, W. and S.E. Frandsen (2002), "China's WTO Comrnmitments in Agriculture:  Does the Impact
Depend  on  OECD  Agricultural  Policies?"  paper  presented  at  the  5h  Conference  on  Global
Economic Analysis, Taipei, 5-7 June.
Zhang, L., J. Huang and S. Rozelle.  2002.  "Employment,  Recessions, and the Role of Education
in Rural China", China Economic Review,  114 (202), pp: 1-16.
Zhao,  Y.  (1999),  "Leaving  the  Countryside:  Rural-to-Urban  Migration  Decision  in  China",
American Economic Review 89(2): 281-86, May.
23Table  1: Growth rates of China's economy,  1970 to 2000 (per cent per year)
Pre-reform  Reform period
1970-78  1979-84  1985-95  1996-00,
Gross domestic product  4.9  8.8  9.7  7.9
Agriculture  2.7  7.1  4.0  3.4
Industry  6.8  8.2  12.8  9.6
Service  na  11.6  9.7  8.3
Food production volume
Grain  2.8  4.7  1.7  0.03
Oilseed crops  2.1  14.9  4.4  5.6
Fruit  6.6  7.2  12.7  8.6
Red meat  4.4  9.1  8.8  6.5
Fish  5.0  7.9  13.7  10.2
Value of output of non-farm
rural enterprises  na  12.3  24.1  14.0
Population  1.80  1.15  1.43  0.91
Per capita GDP  3.1  7.7  8.3  6.9
Note:  Figures for GDP in 1970-78  are the growth rate of national  income in real terms. Growth
rates  are  computed  using  the  regression  method.  Growth  rates  of  individual  and  groups  of
commodities  are based on volume of production data, while sectoral growth rates refer to value
added in real terms.
Source:  SSB,  Statistical Yearbook of China, various  issues;  MOA,  Agricultural
Yearbook of China, various issues.
24Table 2: Farm and rural enterprise (RE) developments  in China,  1980 to 1999
RE's share  RE's share  RE's share  Farm  Non-farm
in rural  in total  in total  land  income
labor  GDP  export  size  share
(%)  (%)  (%)  (ha/farm)  (%)
1980  9  4  0  0.56  17
1985  19  9  15  0.51  25
1990  23  14  43  0.43  26
1995  34  25  48  0.41  37
1999  35  30  48  0.40  47
Source:  SSB, Statistical Yearbook of China, and  China's TVE's Yearbook,  various
issues.
Table  3:  The changing  structure  of China's  economy,  1970  to  2000  (per  cent,
based on current prices)
1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000
Shaure  ofT GID
Agriculture  40  30  28  27  20  16
Industry  46  49  43  42  49  51
Services  13  21  29  31  31  33
Shaire oft empoymeimt
Agriculture  81  69  62  60  52  49
Industry  10  18  21  21  23  23
Services  9  13  17  19  25  28
Shares  of EgwlCnRfuDrs  outpu
Crops  82  76  69  65  58  56
Livestock  14  18  22  26  30  30
Fish  2  2  3  5  8  10
Forestry  2  4  5  4  3  4
Shzire  ot  pEopusiaon  that  Ds  83  81  76  72  71  64
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau,  China Statistical Yearbook, various  issues;  and
China Rural Statistical  Yearbook, various issues.
25Table  4:  China's  grain  production,  consumption  and  trade,  1980  to  1998
(million tons)
1980-89  1990-94  1995-98
Production  332  396  442
Net imports  8  -1  6
Change in stocks  1  11  45
Consumption  339  384  403
Food  - urban  35  42  44
Food  -- rural  177  190  191
Feed  64  86  98
Other (seed, industrial  use, waste)  63  66  70
Source:  Hluang (2001), based on SSB publications  and the CCAP database.
26Table 5: Structure of China's food and feed trade (US$ million),  1980 to 1999
SITC  ¶900  915  1999  199§  t9W
EXPORTS:
Live animals  00  384  304  430  473  374
Meat  01  361  448  791  1,349  1,054
Dairy products  02  71  57  55  61  71
Fish  03  380  283  1,370  2,875  2,969
Grains  04  423  1,065  614  281  1,273
Fruit and veg.  05  746  825  1,759  3,399  3,150
Sugar  06  221  79  317  321  214
Coffee and tea  07  328  435  534  523  561
Animal feeds  08  58  241  623  351  239
Other foods  09  49  66  107  290  541
Oilseeds  22  na  na  na  522  373
Vegetable oils  4  na  na  na  454  132
TOTAL  IFOOD)  39021  3,003  6,600  110,99  O1995n
Live animals  00  5  18  14  18  22
Meat  01  1  6  54  97  503
Dairy products  02  5  31  81  60  160
Fish  03  13  44  102  609  890
Grains  04  2,458  982  2,353  3,631  574
Fruit and veg.  05  48  52  83  185  384
Sugar  06  316  274  390  935  183
Coffee and tea  07  56  40  30  74  72
Animal feeds  08  14  83  182  423  620
Other foods  09  2  23  46  92  182
Oilseeds  22  na  na  na  110  1,531
Vegetable oils  4  na  na  na  2,596  1,352
TOTAL IFOGID)  2,911  11933  3,333  0,020  6"676
NVET EXP7R$TS:
Live animals  00  379  286  416  455  352
Meat  ol  360  442  737  1,252  551
Dairy products  02  66  26  -26  1  -89
Fish  03  367  239  1,268  2,266  2,079
Grains  04  -2,035  83  -1,939  -3,350  663
Fruit and veg.  05  698  773  1,676  3,214  2,766
Sugar  O6  -95  -195  -73  -614  31
Coffee and tea  07  272  395  504  449  489
Animal feeds  08  44  158  441  -72  -381
Other foods  09  47  43  61  198  359
Oilseeds  22  na  na  na  412  -1,158
Vegetable oils  4  na  Na  na  -2,142  -1,220
lTOTAL  IFOID)  103  2,230  3,263  2,07n1  6,77
Source:  Mathews (2002), based on UN COMTRADE  statistics.
27Table  6:  Nominal  rates of protection  (tariff  or tariff equivalent),  agricultural  products,  China,  1978  to
2000, (per cent)
1995  1997  2001  2007  2007  Assumed
in-quota  out-of-  NRP in
tariff  quota tariff  2007 (core
scenario)
Rice  -5  -5  -3  1  65  -3
Wheat  25  17  12  1  65  12
Coarse grains  20  28  20  1  65  32
Vegetables  & fruits  -10  -8  -4  11  11  4
Oilseeds  30  28  32  3  3  3
Sugar  44  42  40  15  50  20
Cotton  20  17  17  1  40  20
Meats  -20  -19  -15  12  12  -15
Milk  30  30  30  11  11  11
Source:  Based on research subsequently  reported in summary form in Huang and Rozelle  (2002).
Table 7: Income, employment and agricultural  output by region, China,  1998 and 2000
Western  Central  Eastern
Provinces  Provinces  Provinces
Income per capita (Yuan in 1998)  4,090  5,280  9,690
Share of population that is rural (%  in 1998)  81  75  71
Share of labor force in agriculture  (% in 1998)  64  55  45
Share of national agricultural GDP (% in 2000)  17  34  49
Share  of regional  food  output  (%  in  2000)  due
to:
Rice  8  11  6
Wheat  5  5  4
Maize  5  5  3
Vegetables  and fruits  11  10  14
Oilseeds  4  6  3
Sugar  0  0  1
Cotton  3  2  1
Dairy products  2  1  1
Other livestock products  20  19  17
Fish products  2  6  20
Other food, agricultural and forest products  40  35  30
TOTAL  100  100  100
Source: Center for Chinese Agricultural  Policy's CAPSIM Model and Carter and Estrin (2001).
28Table 8:  Income and its distribution, rural and urban China, 1980 to 1999
Real per capita  Real per capita net income
income index  Gini  (in  1999 yuan)
Year  Rural  Poorest  Coefficient  Rural  Urban  Urban/rural
20%  ratio
1980  100  100  0.24  616  2062  3.4
1985  189  165  0.26  1193  2605  2.2
1990  218  177  0.31  1380  3217  2.3
1995  272  193  0.33  1702  4713  2.8
1999  349  252  0.35  2210  5854  2.7
Note:  The exchange rate was  8.28 yuan/fJS$ in 1999.
Source:  SSB,  1989-2000,  and rural household income and expenditure surveys.
29Table  9:  Sectoral  volume effects  of China's WTO accession reforms  (core case),  2002 to 2007
(per cent and 1997 US$million)
Trade
Household  Balance  Producer  Consumer
Output  consumption  Exports  Imports  ($m)  Prices  prices
Rice  -2.1  -0.1  6.1  -7.1  64  -0.9  0.9
Wheat  -2.0  0.0  18.9  -10.1  174  -1.7  0.4
Feedgrains  -2.3  -0.1  -77.8  -2.4  -596  -1.9  1.9
Vegetables and fruits  -3.4  0.1  14.6  -6.3  214  -1.9  -0.1
Oilseeds  -7.9  0.9  29.8  20.9  -789  -2.8  -4.7
Sugar  -6.5  0.6  13.9  24.1  -73  -1.9  -3.1
Plant based fibres  15.8  -0.6  -51.8  7.7  -189  0.1  3.1
Livestock & meat  1.3  0.0  15.5  -8.9  837  -1.6  0.2
Dairy  -2.0  0.0  13.5  23.8  -143  -1.5  0.2
Other food  -5.9  0.4  11.4  62.6  -3460  -1.7  -1.8
Beverages & tobacco  -33.0  1.5  9.7  112.4  -14222  -1.8  -6.9
Extractive  industries  -1.0  -0.2  7.5  -4.4  2088  -0.7  1.2
Textiles  15.6  0.7  32.7  38.5  -10366  -1.7  -3.2
Apparel  57.3  0.5  105.8  30.9  49690  -0.5  -1.9
Light manufacturing  3.7  0.0  5.9  6.8  1786  -0.9  0.0
Petrochemical industry  -2.3  -0.2  3.1  11.8  -8810  -0.7  0.8
Metals  -2.1  -0.3  3.7  6.8  -1893  -0.4  1.3
Autos  1.4  1.0  27.7  24.0  516  -3.9  -4.2
Electronics  0.6  0.5  6.7  6.8  453  -1.3  -1.7
Other manufactures  -2.1  -0.2  4.1  18.9  -11291  -0.5  0.8
Trade and transport  0.0  -0.3  0.8  -0.4  493  -0.2  1.6
Construction  0.9  -0.4  2.7  17.5  -436  -0.2  1.7
Communication  -0.5  -0.4  -0.5  10.9  -56  0.1  1.9
Commercial services  -2.0  -0.5  -0.4  35.4  -1749  0.2  1.9
Other services  -1.7  -0.3  1.4  33.6  -1525  -0.1  1.6
Source: Authors'  GTAP results.
30Table  10: Change in China's real factor prices and national economic welfare due to
WTO accession, 2001  to 2007 (per cent, welfare in 1997 US$ billions)
Alternative 2:
Alternative  1:  core case plus  Alternative  3: core
Core  greater  also removing  case plus also
accession  agricultural  negative  agric  removing labor
case  protection cuts  protection  market distortion
Farm unskilled wages  -0.7  -0.9  -0.5  16.8
Rental price of land  -5.5  -6.4  -4.7  -9.7
Nonfarm unskilled wages  1.2  1.4  1.1  -3.8
Skilled labor wages  0.8  1.0  1.5  -1.7
Rental price of capital  1.3  1.5  1.5  -1.4
Farm householda income-A  -1.6  -1.9  -1.3  6.8
Farm householda income-B  -0.8  -0.9  -0.6  3.6
Farm householda income-C  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4
National  economic  welfare
($ billion increase)  9.56  9.57  9.87  11.05
a Farm  income  from agriculture  is made up  of 57% from unskilled  labor,  26%  from land  and
17%  from capital,  according to the GTAP database.  In  1999 on average  51%  of rural household
income  in  China  was  earned  outside  agriculture,  mostly  from  unskilled  labor.  Therefore,  to
illustrate the importance of those off-farm  earnings, three types of farmn households are shown in
this table:  it is assumed nonfarm  unskilled labor contributes  0% of farm  household  income  for
type  A, 30% for type B,  and 60%  for type C.
Source: Authors'  GTAP results.
31Table  11: Effect on agricultural self sufficiency of China's WTO accession without and with cuts
in agricultural  protection  in OECD countries  (domestic  production  as  a percentage  of domestic
consumption)
Base case (no  China's WTO  China's WTO accession
WTO accession  accession  with  with EU, US and Japan
for China)  no change in  removing agric  tariffs,
OECD policies  exports subsidies and
domestic support
Rice  99.9  99.4  99.6
Wheat  93.0  88.2  89.1
Feedgrains  98.1  98.1  99.6
Vegetables  and fruits  99.7  99.7  99.9
Oilseeds  81.0  81.3  82.3
Sugar  77.2  77.4  82.9
Plant-based  fibres  83.8  83.7  83.9
Ruminant meat  88.5  88.2  89.4
Non-ruminant meat  97.7  97.8  98.9
Dairy products  81.8  80.0  84.9
Source:  Yu and Frandsen (2002, Table 4).
32Appendix Table A: Cumulative  (and annual) percentage growth rates over the period 1997-2007
Regions  Population  Unskilled  Skilled  Capital  Manufacturing
Labor  Labor  TFP*
NorthAmerica  11  11  12  49  High
(1.05)  (1.08)  (1.11)  (4.07)
Western Europe  0  -1  1  30  High
(0.03)  (-0.08)  (0.07)  (2.69)
Australia/New Zealand  10  12  10  55  High
(0.98)  (1.14)  (0.99)  (4.45)
Japan  1  -2  -7  35  Medium
(0.06)  (-0.19)  (-0.71)  (3.02)
China  8  13  50  174  High
(0.81)  (1.26)  (4.15)  (10.62)
Taiwan, China  9  11  14  96  High
(0.86)  (1.05)  (1.36)  (6.97)
Other NICs  10  -I  55  88  Medium
(0.93)  (-0.10)  (4.47)  (6.53)
Indonesia  16  17  123  25  Low
(1.50)  (1.59)  (8.36)  (2.27)
Vietnam  15  32  36  111  Medium
(1.40)  (2.79)  (3.10)  (7.78)
Other Southeast Asia  18  22  134  60  Low
(1.70)  (2.04)  (8.87)  (4.83)
India  18  23  78  88  Medium
(1.67)  (2.10)  (5.92)  (6.54)
Other South  Asia  25  30  80  72  Medium
(2.22)  (2.69)  (6,06)  (5.55)
Brazil  14  19  72  31  Medium
(1.31)  (1.77)  (5.60)  (2.75)
Other Latin America  1  8  6  90  54  Low
(1.68)  (0.57)  (6.65)  (4.42)
Turkey  16  19  107  55  Low
(1.47)  (1.75)  (7.55)  (4.46)
Other Middle East & North Africa  24  37  67  28  Low
(2.16)  (3.23)  (5.24)  (2.50)
Economies in Transition  -1  6  9  33  High
(-0.11)  (0.56)  (0.90)  (2.88)
South African Customs Union  15  31  47  34  Low
(1.39)  (2.76)  (3.92)  (2.94)
Other Sub-Saharan  Africa  30  40  54  38  Medium
(2.65)  (3.42)  (4.42)  (3.26)
Rest of World  1  8  23  35  68  Low
(1.63)  (2.10)  (3.05)  (5.32)
*The low, medium, and high growth assumptions  for total factor  productivity (TFP)  in manufacturing
correspond  to annual growth rates of 0.1 %, 1.0%,  and above 2.0% (between 2%  and 4%), respectively.
Source:  Lanchovichina and Martin (2002)
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